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The experimental research that looks into the effects of political humor on an individual’s
attitudes toward politics and politicians does not evaluate its long-term effects. With
this in mind, this study aims to determine the possible effects that being exposed
to humor which belittles politicians may have on an ordinary citizen’s trust in them,
while at the same time it observes the possible effects that such exposure has on
them and the time such effects last. Two hypotheses were tested. The first one was
that humor involves less cognitive elaboration, which leads to a short-term impact
on the perception of the individual. The second one was that the repetition of a
message can augment the swing of such message. Also, a series of elements regarding
disposition toward politicians and political affiliation were considered. Two experiments
were designed. The first experiment, (N = 94), considered three groups: one exposed
to political disparagement humor; one control group exposed to disparagement humor
against non-politician subjects; and a control group exposed to a non-humorous political
video. Trust in politicians was evaluated first at baseline, then immediately after the
experimental manipulation, and once again a week after the experimental manipulation
had happened. In the second experiment (N = 146), participants were randomly
assigned to one experimental and two control groups. The trust in politicians of the three
groups was estimated and they were sent political cartoons, non-political cartoons, and
newspaper headlines regarding political topics twice a day for a week via WhatsApp.
Trust in politicians among the three groups was assessed again after 1 week, and for
a third time 1 week after that. As a result, it was observed that a one-off exposure to
political disparagement humor affects trust in politicians negatively; however, the effect
it attains is short-lived and can be explained through the political content of the item
and not only humor. Also, being exposed to cartoons constantly for a week had no
impact whatsoever on the way politics and politicians were perceived during the time
the experiment was carried out. Possible explanations for these findings are discussed.
Keywords: political humor, trust in politicians, disparagement humor, elaboration likelihood model, disposition
theory
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INTRODUCTION
The main aim of this research is to observe the possible effects
that being exposed to political disparagement humor has on
trust in politicians. This has been studied (e.g., Olson et al.,
1999; Baumgartner et al., 2012), but the possible duration of
effects has not been considered before, which provided the focus
of the research reported here. Most of the empirical research
on the topic of humor and politics has considered short-term
effects when using experimental designs (e.g., Hobden and Olson,
1994; Olson et al., 1999; Holbert et al., 2007; Baumgartner
and Morris, 2008; Kim and Vishak, 2008; Xenos and Becker,
2009; Becker, 2011, 2014; Becker and Haller, 2014) or non-
experimental designs (e.g., Moy et al., 2005, 2006; Kenski and
Stroud, 2006; Cao, 2008; Baumgartner, 2013) but the duration
of the possible effects has not been studied using follow-up
assessments after the initial post-exposure assessments. In this
view, the two experiments presented here seek not only to assess
the effect of political disparagement humor but also to observe its
possible consequences 1 week after the exposure had occurred.
DISPARAGEMENT HUMOR
Disparagement humor (Zillmann, 1983) refers to the use
of humor to denigrate a given target (Ferguson and Ford,
2008; for a review, see Wicker et al., 1980). According to
Ferguson and Ford (2008, p. 283), “disparagement humor
refers to remarks that (are intended to) elicit amusement
through the denigration, derogation, or belittlement of a
given target (e.g., individuals, social groups, political ideologies,
material possessions),” enabling the expression and satisfaction
of aggressive impulses in a socially acceptable way (Ferguson and
Ford, 2008).
Disparagement humor is strongly related to prejudice (Ford
and Ferguson, 2004), given that humor communication is not
intended to be evaluated in a serious way. When a targeted
group is disparaged, people will be less likely to be critical of
the content of that message and will, consequently, adopt the
attitudes implicit in the message (Nabi et al., 2007). This, in turn,
could lead to a lower threshold to accept discrimination. This
principle can be extended to the political arena, considering that
when denigration is expressed in a humorous manner people
will be in a good disposition to accept a negative description of
politicians.
Although the use of this type of humor can be interpreted
within the framework of either psychoanalytic or superiority
theories, it has also been analyzed within social identity theory
(Tajfel, 1974, 1979, 1982; Tajfel and Billig, 1974). According
to this view, people construct their social identity through the
comparison of the groups they belong to (in-groups) with other
groups (out-groups). This comparison serves to achieve a positive
distinctiveness, enhancing features that favor the in-group over
the out-group arbitrarily. In this context, disparagement humor
may be used as a way to obtain a positive distinctiveness,
especially in the face of perceived identity threats from the out-
groups, considering that people should be more amused when
disparagement targets an out-group, as suggested in the literature
(Wolff et al., 1934).
Another way of understanding the joy that disparagement
humor causes can be found in Zillmann and Cantor’s (1976)
disposition theory of humor and disposition theory of mirth.
Disposition theory of humor is a conceptual framework deriving
from disparagement humor (Wicker et al., 1980), but it relates
better to superiority theories than to social identity theories.
According to disposition theory, the response to humorous
stimuli depends on the affective disposition toward the targeted
person or group (McGhee and Lloyd, 1981; Becker, 2014).
This theory posits that people react affectively to any target in
a continuum that ranges from extreme positivity to extreme
negativity, through a neutral point. In that context, it is
considered that the closer the targeted group is toward the
negative pole, the more amusement, humor, or mirth will be
perceived by the individuals (Zillmann and Cantor, 1976).
The literature suggests that humor in general, and
disparagement humor in particular, can be enjoyed because
it acts as a kind of “mental balm,” which allows the sender to
deliver information by bringing about “high spirits,” thus creating
greater possibilities for the messages to be received effectively
(Sternthal and Craig, 1973; Kuiper et al., 1995). This would
generate positive affect that would inhibit counterargument
(Mackie and Worth, 1989), which can also be understood
through the elaboration likelihood model.
The elaboration likelihood model posits that individuals
are not always either thoughtful or mindless about messages
(Cacioppo and Petty, 1984; Petty and Cacioppo, 1984a, 1986;
Cacioppo et al., 1985). Instead, different factors influence the
way in which people process the information they obtain from
the environment. When these factors or sources enhance interest
in the received message, the elaboration likelihood is higher, so
people will be more likely to process and think carefully about the
arguments proposed by the message. Conversely, when interest is
lowered, the elaboration likelihood is also lower, which will lead
to the opposite consequence. Therefore, messages are processed
in two ways: a central route, where the message is as persuasive
as the argument is adequate, and a peripheral route, which is
affective and non-critical, implying less cognitive elaboration
(Petty and Cacioppo, 1986).
When elaboration likelihood is high, people will prefer central
routes of persuasion (Petty and Cacioppo, 1984b), meaning that
they will evaluate the positive and negative arguments with
some care. However, when elaboration likelihood is low, people
will prefer peripheral routes. These are characterized by cues
external to the actual message, such as the external features of
the transmitter or the quantity of arguments instead of their
quality. LaMarre et al. (2014) observed that messages based on
humor tend to decrease the recipients’ motivation to process the
arguments underlying such messages, making it more likely for
them to adopt the attitudes implicit in the message (Nabi et al.,
2007), since exposure to humor implies a reduced willingness to
argue against it (Baumgartner and Morris, 2008).
The elaboration likelihood model also posits that message
repetition has an effect on persuasion, explained by a two-stage
process (Cacioppo and Petty, 1979). When someone is exposed
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to a message, the repeated presentation of it can enhance the
ability to process arguments. However, this process can also lead
to a second stage in which repetition can produce tedium or
reactance, and therefore decreased message acceptance by, for
example, acting as a negative affective cue.
It is particularly interesting to consider the elaboration
likelihood model when talking about the possible effects of
being exposed to political disparagement humor and its duration
because attitudes formed or changed by the peripheral route are
less persistent (Petty et al., 2005). Also, as moderate repetition can
have positive effects on persuasion, it can be hypothesized that
a constant exposure to political disparagement humor will have
effects on trust in politicians and that these effects will not be as
short-lived as the ones caused by a one-time exposure.
Finally, evidence supports the idea that humor is processed
via the peripheral rather than the central route (Zhang, 1996;
Young, 2004; Baumgartner and Morris, 2008). Zhang (1996)
found that humor (in the form of humorous advertisement)
was more effective in the case of people that were low in need
of cognition (i.e., people who are not predisposed to scrutinize
and evaluate messages) and less effective in the case of people
high in need of cognition. In the case of political humor, it has
been observed that when people are presented with a humorous
message which criticizes a political party, they tend to challenge
less than if the message was presented seriously (Young, 2004).
POLITICAL DISPARAGEMENT HUMOR
AND ITS EFFECTS ON ATTITUDES
According to Paletz (1990) humor directed against authority can
be subverting, involving disparagement of political figures or
ideologies, and can shape the attitudes of those who are exposed
to this type of humor (Zenner, 1970; La Fave and Mannell,
1976). If disparagement humor makes negative stereotypes more
accessible, the same stereotypes can take a person to have specific
perceptions about targeted groups (Olson et al., 1999).
Effects of political disparagement humor on attitudes of those
who are exposed to it have been a subject of a range of empirical
studies (e.g., Hobden and Olson, 1994; Olson et al., 1999;
Moy et al., 2006; Baumgartner et al., 2012; Baumgartner, 2013;
Becker, 2014; Becker and Haller, 2014), though this research
has not proved completely conclusive. This means that while
some studies have not found any effects of the exposure to
disparagement humor on attitudes (Olson et al., 1999), others
have done so. For example, Baumgartner et al. (2012) found
evidence suggesting that the impersonation of Sarah Palin by
Tina Fey did achieve changes in attitudes toward her candidacy
as Vice President (people who saw the spoof had a higher
probability of disapproving her choice). Similarly, Hobden and
Olson (1994) observed that after reading disparaging jokes
about lawyers, people expressed more negative evaluations about
them, which could lead to dissonance and therefore changes in
attitudes (Olson et al., 1999). To summarize, though the existing
research is not completely conclusive, most of the literature tends
to acknowledge the effects of humor, including disparagement
humor, on attitudes.
AIMS AND HYPOTHESES
Two things can be concluded from the above review of the
literature: firstly, political disparagement humor can have an
effect on trust in politicians, as most of the previous research
shows; secondly, this effect will be short-lived since humor
probably implies less cognitive elaboration which leads to
less persistent changes on attitudes, something that has been
specifically addressed by other researchers such as Baumgartner
and Morris (2008). However, moderate repetition of a message
can help in reinforcing and changing attitudes. Thus, the
following hypotheses guided this research:
• One-off exposure to political humor will have a negative effect
on trust in politicians, but this effect will be short-lived (with
the impact wearing off after a period of 1 week).
• Being exposed to political humor (through cartoons) on a daily
basis will have a negative effect on trust in politicians, and this
effect will not decrease after 1 week.
STUDY 1
The first study sought to determine the effect of political stand-
up comedy on people’s trust in politicians and whether the
effect wears off over time. With this in mind, an experimental
pretest–posttest control group design was created, with a first
experimental group which was exposed to a video containing
political disparagement humor, a second control group that was
exposed to a video which showed instances of disparaging humor
against regular, non-political citizens, and a third one exposed to
a non-humorous political video. Trust in politicians was assessed
in all the three groups at the baseline, immediately after the
experimental manipulation, and once again a week later. As an
incentive to take part in the experiment all participants had an
equal chance to win a $50 gift voucher.
Method and Procedure
Procedure
The questionnaire was programmed on 25 computers in
a university laboratory. During a 2-week period, laboratory
sessions were held at the university campus. The experiment was
explained to the participants in the campus in broad terms by two
research assistants. After that, those who accepted to take part in
the experiment were taken to the laboratory and were asked to
read and sign an informed consent.
A baseline questionnaire which included the dependent
variable, trust in politicians, along with disposition toward
politicians, political affiliation, and assessment of sex and age was
presented to the volunteers (Time 1). After having completed the
baseline questionnaire, they were automatically and randomly
assigned to one of the three conditions and were exposed to the
respective stimuli.
Once they had watched each video, a second questionnaire
was presented to them to be filled out containing the dependent
variable, an assessment of cognitive elaboration, and of funniness
and aversiveness (Time 2). Finally, 1 week later, they were sent
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an electronic link with a third questionnaire containing the
dependent variable (Time 3).
Sample
We used the G∗Power software (Faul et al., 2009) to determine
the minimum sample size required for obtaining a significant
medium effect size (f = 0.25), given α = 0.05, and a statistical
power of 0.80, assuming no correlation between measures.
With this analysis, we estimated a minimum sample size of 69
individuals. One hundred and fifty-eight undergraduate students
participated in Study 1, and were randomly assigned to each
of the three groups. Sixty-two participants were dismissed from
analyses because they either (a) failed in watching the video –
which was inferred from the time they took in completing the
study – or (b) did not follow the instructions appropriately (for
example, used their phones, talked with other participants during
the experiment, or opened web pages on the computer). Attrition
followed a random pattern, given that no significant differences
were found between those participants who were considered
in the final sample and participants who were not, either by
sociodemographic characteristics, such as age, F(1,156) = 0.121,
p > 0.05, η2 = 0.001, and sex, χ2(1) = 3.599, p > 0.05, or baseline
trust, F(1,154) = 2.564, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.016. Fifty-one percent
of the participants were male, and the mean of the age was 20.96
(SD = 2.15). Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in
Table 1.
Stimuli
Three videos were used. For the videos containing humor
(i.e., experimental group and the control group exposed to
the disparagement humor against the non-politicians video)
two edited stand-up comedy routines were used. Both were by
the same comedian (Edo Caroe, a popular Chilean stand-up
comedian and magician), which aired in 2015 and 2016 and
presented on the Festival of Viña del Mar and the Festival del
Huaso de Olmué, both Chilean festivals with live transmission
to Latin America. The presentations were edited to have similar
duration (12 min and 32 s for the experimental video and
13 min and 2 s for control video containing humor) and to
ensure that their content would be in line with the aims of the
study.
To assess the validity of the videos that we used, we asked
four evaluators (university students) to rate four statements about
the experimental video and three about the control video. The
statements are displayed in Table 2.
TABLE 1 | Sex and age descriptive statistics for the three groups.
Group n Sex Age (SD)
Men Women
Political disparagement
humor
31 51.60% 48.40% 20.90 (2.06)
Disparagement humor
against non-politicians
34 46.90% 53.10% 20.75 (2.00)
Non-humorous political
video
31 54.80% 45.20% 21.23 (2.40)
TABLE 2 | Statements presented to assess stimuli validity.
Political humor (experimental) Non-political video (control)
It is funny It is funny
It is political humor It is political humor
There is disparagement There is disparagement
It does not specially attack politicians of a
political party, but instead criticizes transversally
–
To do this, the raters had to answer “yes” or “no” to each
statement. In every case, each rater agreed on the same answer. In
the case of the experimental video, the four raters answered “yes”
to all the statements. In the case of the control video, the four
raters answered “yes” to the statements “it is funny” and “there is
disparagement” and “no” to the statement “it is political humor.”
Parts of the transcription of the video which used political
disparagement humor are below:
For example Senator Pizarro. When his region most needed
him, he traveled to England in order to attend a rugby match.
Rugby has always been a gentleman’s sport, what was he
doing there?! If he wanted to see dirty people, he could have
gone to La Moneda!
Politicians in Chile are dumb. They were bought by big
enterprises, write useless laws. For example, Jaime Orpis
received bribes from Corpesca. Money, real money! Bribes in
Chile are strange: I always thought that bribes involved two
men with suits, sunglasses in a dark alley leaving a suitcase,
or at a restaurant, passing a suitcase under the table. It is
different in Chile. Here politicians give you a receipt. Let’s be
corrupt but keep things in order. Jaime Orpis is so stupid that
he even wrote on the receipt “Bribe May 2015.”
Every time our politicians are on TV, no one thinks “oh, great,
our politicians on TV, let’s see what the new social advance
is.” No, it’s “what did they do now?”. That happens to me
every time I see Gustavo Hasbún. Every time. Have you ever
seen someone more stupid than Hasbún? He’s so stupid that
idiots refer to themselves as “Hasbún.”
Let’s take a look at the example of Dávalos (Michele
Bachelet’s son). He got rich using his position and, not happy
with that, he erased everything, all the evidence that was
on his computer. You might even say he was something like
Pinochet. He tried to eliminate the PC (Note: in Spanish, PC
can also mean “partido comunista” or “communist party”).
Let’s be clear, the president has had bad luck. She has been a
lousy manager but she has had bad luck. The other day I saw
a black cat that was very scared because it met Bachelet. She
never knows anything! One day she met Daddy Yankee and
he told her “You know” (Note: his catchphrase) and the lady
didn’t know!
Some parts of the transcription of the video using
disparagement humor against non-politicians are below:
You can’t imagine how nervous I am of being here. I wasn’t
this nervous since my wife gave birth. I hope Birth will be able
to forgive us when she grows up.
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My mother always said that when you go somewhere where
no one knows you, you must introduce yourself, so well, my
name is Edo Caroe, I’m a comedian, I come from Temuco.
Somebody from Temuco here? A horrible city, that’s why I
left. No, no, sorry. Just kidding. I’m proud of Temuco, I have
always been.
I decided to become a comedian just to see my father smile. I
then found out that I should have been a doctor, since he has
a horrible facial paralysis.
My father just learned how to use WhatsApp and he spends
the whole day sending nude pictures of naked women to me.
He’s a forensic expert.
I’ve always liked humor, maybe because it has always been
difficult for me to be still and not move. My mother always
remembers how I kicked her belly. Especially when she was
pregnant with my sister.
I love my daughter. She is older now, she lost her first tooth
yesterday. I apologized and promised I wouldn’t drink again.
Last night she went to our room exactly when my wife was
having an orgasm. It was a very uncomfortable moment for
me and my friends, but it was a good opportunity to teach
her about teamwork.
I’ve always wanted to come to this city. My family was
very happy for me, my grandmother who has diabetes was
jumping on one leg. The other one had been amputated. But
I was not sure if I should come. I thought it would be difficult,
more difficult than playing Scrabble with a dyslexic kid. I
decided to come because I like risks. I like risks so much,
that if Johnny Herrera (Note: a football player involved in
a car accident) offers to give me a lift, I say yes. Really. I
once bungee jumped from Lucho Jara’s ego (Note: a famous
TV host). And most people don’t understand those that
like taking risks. Loving risk is going to “Who wants to
be a millionaire” and use “Ask a Friend” to call Arturo
Longton.
The second control group was exposed to a non-humorous
political video. This was a video blog by the Chilean journalist
Tomás Mosciatti. To assess its validity the same questions as the
ones used with the humorous videos were used with the same
four raters. They all agreed that it was not funny, that it was
disparaging, that it had political content, and that it attacked
targets across the political spectrum.
Instruments
Trust in politicians
A modified version of the Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s General
Trust Scale was used (Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994) replacing
“people” by “politicians.” It was assessed by means of a 100-point
scale that ranged from total disagreement to total agreement
and covered the following statements: “Most politicians are
essentially honest,” “Most politicians are essentially good and
kind,” “Most politicians are trustworthy,” and “Most politicians
will respond kindly when they are trusted by others.” Scale
reliability was high for the baseline questionnaire (α = 0.76),
the second questionnaire (α = 0.79), and the third questionnaire
(α = 0.82).
Disposition toward politicians
It was assessed with the item “How much would you say you like
politicians?” with responses ranging from 1 (Do not like) to 100
(Like very much).
Political affiliation
Participants were asked about their political ideology according
to a left-right political spectrum, for which possible responses
were “Left wing,” “Center-Left wing,” “Center,” “Center Right Wing,”
“Right Wing,” or “None of the above.”
Funniness
It was assessed with one item that ranged from 1 (not funny) to
100 (very funny).
Aversiveness
It was assessed with one item that ranged from 1 (no aversiveness)
to 100 (high aversiveness).
Cognitive elaboration
It was assessed using a modified version of the scale created
by Igartua (2010), considering a 100-point scale that varied
between total disagreement and total agreement to the following
statements: “I have reflected on the topic it dealt with,” “I have
thought about the situation and the motivations of the characters,”
“I have tried to see how the plot was related to other topics that
interest me,” and “I have wanted to draw some conclusions about
the topic addressed here.” Scale reliability was high (α = 0.81).
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Checks
First, the experimental manipulation was checked. A univariate
ANOVA revealed significant differences in funniness,
F(2,91) = 93.261, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.672. The Tukey post
hoc test showed that the control group exposed to the non-
humorous political video (M = 14.00, SD = 19.689) was different
from both the experimental group (M = 80.61, SD = 24.52) and
the control group exposed to the disparagement humor against
non-politicians video (M = 75.28, SD = 19.64), p < 0.001 in
both cases. In addition, there were no significant differences
in aversiveness among the groups, F(2,91) = 2.559, p > 0.05,
η2 = 0.053. These results suggest that the manipulation through
exposure to video was successful.
Means and standard deviations for the three groups regarding
trust at times 1, 2, and 3, funniness, aversiveness, and cognitive
elaboration can be found in Table 3.
Main Analyses
We controlled for disposition and political affiliation by using
randomized groups. In this case, no differences between the
groups regarding both variables were found.
The first hypothesis refers to the cognitive elaboration that
each stimulus implied, so as to observe if less elaboration
was being used in the case of humorous stimuli. A univariate
ANOVA showed significant differences regarding this variable,
F(2,91) = 12.875, p < 0.000, η2 = 0.223. The main differences
were observed contrasting the control group exposed to the
video presenting disparagement humor against non-politicians
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 5 December 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 2236
fpsyg-08-02236 December 21, 2017 Time: 15:5 # 6
Mendiburo-Seguel et al. Humor and Trust in Politicians
TABLE 3 | Means and standard deviations for trust times 1, 2, and 3, funniness, aversiveness, and cognitive elaboration.
M SD
Trust time 1 Political disparagement humor 30.23 13.72
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 28.76 16.18
Non-humorous political video 30.20 15.27
Trust time 2 Political disparagement humor 23.56 9.79
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 30.78 15.37
Non-humorous political video 23.25 17.38
Trust time 3 Political disparagement humor 29.06 13.03
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 28.82 13.10
Non-humorous political video 28.57 16.45
Funninness Political disparagement humor 80.61 24.51
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 75.00 19.73
Non-humorous political video 14.00 19.69
Aversiveness Political disparagement humor 30.00 24.80
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 32.12 23.69
Non-humorous political video 20.58 25.71
Cognitive Elaboration Political disparagement humor 68.69 15.64
Disparagement humor against non-politicians 46.10 19.34
Non-humorous political video 63.48 21.98
(M = 45.30, SD = 19.58) to both the experimental group
(M = 68.69, SD = 15.64) and the control group exposed to the
non-humorous political video (M = 63.48, SD = 21.98), p < 0.001
in both cases.
The second hypothesis, and the core of Study 1, refers to
the effects of political humor on political trust. A 3 (condition)
by 3 (time) ANOVA with repeated measures was performed.
The results showed a significant main effect of the measures of
political trust, F(2,182) = 6.344, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.065, but not of
the group, F(1,91) = 0.405, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.009. Nevertheless,
and more importantly, the interaction between both factors was
significant, F(4,182) = 3.949, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.080. It is important
to note that for the effects of the measures of political trust
and the interaction between the factors, the observed power was
high (0.896 and 0.900, respectively). When controlled by either
funniness or aversiveness, a similar pattern of results was found,
obtaining in both cases the same significant interaction term,
F(4,180) = 3.384, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.070, and F(4,180) = 3.528,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.073, respectively.
Given these results, we contrasted the effects of group on
political trust, for each measure separately. For the baseline,
we found no significant differences by group, F(2,91) = 0.007,
p > 0.05, η2 = 0.000. In the first post-measure, we observed
significant differences, F(2,91) = 3.241, p < 0.05, η2 = 0.066.
The post hoc analysis revealed that the control group exposed
to the video presenting disparagement humor against non-
politicians (M = 31.50, SD = 15.56) was marginally different
from both the experimental (M = 23.56, SD = 9.79), p < 0.1,
and the control groups exposed to the non-humorous political
video (M = 23.25, SD = 17.38), p < 0.1. Finally, in the second
post-measure, there were no significant differences between the
groups, F(2,91) = 1.815, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.000.
In sum, the overall pattern of results suggests that both
groups exposed to political content declined in political trust
FIGURE 1 | Trust in politicians at times 1, 2, and 3 (Study 1).
immediately after viewing the video, but returned to the baseline
levels 1 week later, as it is shown in Figure 1 (each error bar is
constructed using a 95% confidence interval of the mean).
It must be considered that these results are independent of
either the perceived funniness or the perceived aversiveness,
as was shown earlier. A supplementary analysis showed
that funniness was not significantly related to trust in
the baseline, the second measure, and the last measure
for the experimental group, with similar results for those
participants assigned to control group 1 and those assigned
to control group 2. The same pattern of results was obtained
analyzing the relationship between aversiveness and the three
measures of trust for those assigned to the experimental
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group, for those assigned to the first control group, and those
assigned to the second control. In addition, there was no
relationship between funniness and elaboration, neither for the
experimental group nor for both the control group exposed
to disparagement humor and the control group exposed to
the non-humorous political video. This can be observed in
Table 4.
Discussion
Results from study 1 show two key elements of this research.
On the one hand, it was observed that the effect of political
disparagement humor on individuals tends to be similar to the
effect of political information that is non-humorous. This can
be due to the fact that political humor implies more cognitive
elaboration than non-political humor, even at the same level of
political non-humorous information. On the other hand, it was
also observed that the effects in both cases did not last long, being,
as hypothesized, short-lived.
One topic is still open regarding whether constant
presentation of a stimulus for a long period of time implies
long-term effects. With the intention of addressing this, a second
study was designed.
STUDY 2
The second experiment aimed to find evidence on the way that
being exposed to political humor (in the form of cartoons) on a
daily basis might impact trust of the individuals in politicians.
For this purpose, a pretest–posttest control group design was
used. Participants were university students at the university
campus. They first received the baseline questionnaire which
contained assessments of trust in politicians, political affiliation,
disposition toward politicians, exposure to political humor,
exposure to political information, sex, age, and WhatsApp
number. After this, participants were randomly assigned either
to an experimental or to one of two control groups, which
received different stimuli via WhatsApp twice a day for 1 week.
The experimental group received political cartoons; the first
control group received non-political cartoons; and the second
control group received newspaper headlines regarding political
topics (such as conflicts of interests). Trust in politicians and
attention paid to the stimuli among the three groups were
assessed again after 1 week and a third time after 2 weeks via
WhatsApp. As in study 1, as an incentive to take part in the
experience, all participants had an equal chance to win three $50
gift vouchers.
Method and Procedure
Procedure
A research assistant contacted the participants on the university
campus and explained the general aim of the study and the
procedure. They were given an informed consent document
that explained the study in detail. After agreeing to participate
in the study, the participants were given a questionnaire
with baseline questions (Time 1) containing the dependent
variables (trust in politicians), political affiliation, disposition
toward politicians, exposure to political humor, exposure to
political information, sex, age, and a WhatsApp number. Starting
TABLE 4 | Correlations between considered variables.
Trust
time 1
Trust
time 2
Trust
time 3
Funninness Aversiveness Political
affiliation
Disposition
toward politicians
Political disparagement Trust time 2 0.57∗∗ 1.00
humor Trust time 3 0.69∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 1.00
Funninness −0.17 −0.20 −0.21 1.00
Aversiveness −0.35 0.17 −0.01 −0.36∗ 1.00
Political affiliation −0.03 0.02 −0.31∗ −0.15 0.06 1.00
Disposition toward politicians 0.42∗∗ 0.69∗∗ 0.43∗∗ −0.15 0.04 0.02 1.00
Cognitive elaboration −0.28 −0.45∗∗ −0.38∗ 0.16 −0.35∗ −0.14 −0.25
Disparagement humor Trust time 2 0.80∗∗ 1
against non-politicians Trust time 3 0.75∗∗ 0.82∗∗ 1
Funninness 0.15 0.11 0.05 1
Aversiveness −0.10 −0.07 0.03 −0.20 1
Political affiliation −0.07 0.07 0.09 −0.03 −0.1 1
Disposition toward politicians 0.67∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.07 −0.11 0.02 1
Cognitive elaboration 0.15 −0.01 0.10 0.31∗ 0.13 −0.20 −0.08
Non-humorous political Trust time 2 0.70∗∗ 1.00
video Trust time 3 0.72∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 1.00
Funninness 0.13 0.13 0.11 1.00
Aversiveness −0.19 0.04 −0.09 0.09 1.00
Political affiliation 0.06 0.19 0.18 −0.13 0.27 1.00
Disposition toward politicians 0.60∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.44∗∗ −0.10 −0.21 0.19 1.00
Cognitive elaboration 0.06 −0.06 0.02 0.09 −0.06 −0.27 −0.15
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
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the next day and for 7 days, the stimuli were sent via
WhatsApp to the participants who were randomly assigned to
the experimental group (political cartoons), the first control
group (non-political cartoons), and the second control group
(newspaper headlines regarding political topics). After that
week, the same questions assessing trust in politicians were
sent to the experimental and control groups (Time 2). Finally,
1 week later, the three groups were sent the same questions
(Time 3).
Sample
We used the GPower software (Faul et al., 2009) to determine
the minimum sample size required, considering the effect
size obtained in study 1 (f = 0.29), given α = 0.05, and
a statistical power of 0.80, assuming no correlation between
measures. With this analysis, we estimated a minimum sample
size of 78 individuals. Three hundred and forty-seven students
participated in the baseline (59.1% women, Mage = 20.90,
SD = 1.73). One hundred and ninety-seven of them sent their
responses back after 1 week (55.8% women, Mage = 20.83,
SD = 1.69). Finally, 146 sent their responses back 1 week
after that (50.7%women, Mage = 20.81, SD = 1.67). It can
be established that there are no differences between those
who were part of the final sample and those who were
not, since attrition followed a random pattern. No significant
differences were found between the two groups regarding age,
F(1,345) = 0.738, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.002, sex, χ2(1) = 2.573,
p > 0.05, baseline trust, F(1,343) = 2.762, p > 0.05, η2 = 0.008
and disposition toward politicians, F(1,345) = 0.997, p > 0.05,
η2 = 0.003. Descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in
Table 5.
Stimuli
We used 14 political cartoons selected from image databases
that implied criticism toward politicians in general, with no
party-political bias. None referred to a politician or political
figure identified by name or appearance. Two university students
rated the 14 cartoons with complete agreement, evaluating
disparagement (“There is disparagement” with response options
being “yes” and “no”), if they were political (“It is political humor”
with response options being “yes” and “no”), and if they were
transversal (“It does not specially attack politicians of a political
party, but instead criticizes transversally” with response options
being “yes” and “no”). An example of a cartoon by the Chilean
cartoonist Malaimagen is displayed in Figure 2. In the case of the
14 non-political cartoons and the 14 newspaper headlines there
was also agreement.
TABLE 5 | Sex and age descriptive statistics for the three groups Study 2.
Group n Sex Age (SD)
Men Women
Political cartoons 54 57.4% 42.6% 20.85 (1.83)
Non-political cartoons 43 46.5% 53.5% 20.84 (1.59)
Newspaper headlines 49 42.9% 57.1% 20.73 (1.60)
FIGURE 2 | Example of cartoon used for study 2.
Instruments
Trust in politicians
We used the same adaptation used in study 1. It presented
adequate internal consistency considering Cronbach’s Alpha at
times 1, 2, and 3 (0.83, 0.84 and 0.89, respectively).
Attention
We asked the participants to rate how much attention they pay
to the stimuli after the 1st week (1 = No attention; 100 = Total
attention).
Disposition toward politicians
It was assessed with the item “How much would you say you like
politicians?” with responses ranging from 1 (Do not like) to 100
(Like very much).
Political affiliation
Participants were asked about their political ideology according
to a left–right political spectrum, for which possible responses
were “Left wing,” “Center-Left wing,” “Center,” “Center Right Wing,”
“Right Wing,” or “None of the above.”
Exposure to political humor
We used the item “How often do you watch shows or read websites
or newspapers that make fun of politicians?” (1: Almost never; 10:
Always).
Exposure to political information
We used the item “How often do you watch shows or read websites
or newspapers that refer to politics?” (1: Almost never; 10: Always).
Funniness and aversiveness were not assessed. This decision
was made due to the characteristics of the design, and given
that it would have involved asking participants to rate the
stimuli twice a day for 7 days, which could have led to higher
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attrition (57.9%). Considering that, we decided to assess trust and
attention after the exposure to the stimuli, since funniness and
aversion had already been rated by two raters. This is discussed in
the limitations sections.
Results
The three groups were not different regarding sex,
χ2(2,146) = 2.368, p > 0.05, age, F(2,45) = 1.287, p > 0.05,
η2 = 0.057, political affiliation, F(2,143) = 0.071, p > 0.05,
η2 = 0.001, or disposition toward politicians, F(2,143) = 1.176,
p > 0.05, η2 = 0.016. With this in mind, the decision was made
to repeat the analysis of Study 1. In this case, a 3 (condition)-
by-3 (time) ANOVA with repeated measures in the last factor
was performed. The results showed no significant effect of
either condition, F(2,143) = 0.226, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003, time,
F(2,286) = 2.078, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.014, or the interaction term,
F(4,286) = 0.153, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.002. The observed power for
the three terms was low (0.085, 0.426, and 0.082, respectively).
However, this should not be considered as a reason to discard this
results since – as it will be discussed in the conclusions section –
non-significant results can correspond to low observed power
(Hoenig and Heisey, 2001). Means and confidence intervals for
each condition in times 1, 2, and 3 can be observed in Figure 3
(each error bar is constructed using a 95% confidence interval
of the mean). Means and standard deviations for each group at
times 1, 2, and 3 can be found in Table 6.
We performed three supplementary analyses including
attention, exposure to political information, and exposure
to political humor as covariates in separated models, but
we obtained similar results. Specifically, when attention was
included, we observed non-significant effects of either condition,
F(2,101) = 0.523, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.010, time, F(2,202) = 2.666,
p > 0.05, η2p = 0.026, attention, F(1,101) = 0.002, p > 0.05,
η2p = 0.000, the interaction term between time and condition,
FIGURE 3 | Trust in politicians at times 1, 2, and 3 (Study 2).
TABLE 6 | Means and standard deviations for trust times 1, 2, and 3, attention,
exposure to political humor and exposure to political information (Study 2).
M SD
Trust time 1 Political cartoons 28.97 16.79
Non-political cartoons 27.32 16.98
Newspaper headlines 26.40 18.06
Trust time 2 Political cartoons 29.20 16.79
Non-political cartoons 28.59 15.79
Newspaper headlines 27.42 17.12
Trust time 3 Political cartoons 29.93 16.39
Non-political cartoons 29.70 16.53
Newspaper headlines 27.96 17.47
Attention Political cartoons 81.73 31.08
Non-political cartoons 80.07 23.09
Newspaper headlines 73.92 27.44
Exposure to political humor Political cartoons 5.65 2.69
Non-political cartoons 4.38 2.54
Newspaper headlines 4.78 2.26
Exposure to political information Political cartoons 5.13 1.98
Non-political cartoons 5.21 2.48
Newspaper headlines 5.03 2.46
F(4,202) = 0.128, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003, and the interaction
term between time and attention, F(2,202) = 1.861, p > 0.05,
η2p = 0.018. The observed power for the terms was 0.134,
0.525, 0.050, 0.076, and 0.385, respectively. When exposure to
political information was included, there were no significant
effects of either condition, F(2,101) = 0.524, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.010,
time, F(2,202) = 2.885, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.028, exposure to
political information, F(1,101) = 0.117, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.001, the
interaction term between time and condition, F(4,202) = 0.157,
p > 0.05, η2p = 0.003, and the interaction term between time and
exposure to political information, F(2,202) = 1.928, p > 0.05,
η2p = 0.019. The observed power for the terms was 0.134, 0.560,
0.063, 0.083, and 0.397, respectively. Finally, when we included
exposure to political humor, there were no significant effects of
either condition, F(2,101) = 0.389, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.019, time,
F(2,202) = 0.595, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.006, exposure to political
humor, F(1,101) = 2.980, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.029, the interaction
term between time and condition, F(4,202) = 0.250, p > 0.05,
η2p = 0.005, and the interaction term between time and exposure
to political humor, F(2,202) = 0.987, p > 0.05, η2p = 0.010. The
observed power for the terms was 0.211, 0.148, 0.401, 0.104, and
0.220, respectively.
CONCLUSION
In general terms, the obtained results point in the expected
direction in most cases, but there are at least two elements
that are worth considering. According to what was observed in
study 1, political disparagement humor has an effect on trust in
politicians. However, trust in politicians returns to the same level
as the control groups in a second post-exposure measurement.
It seems to be that humor can affect attitudes temporarily,
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but does not change them permanently. These results are in
accordance with earlier findings (Weinberger and Gulas, 1992;
Olson et al., 1999). Although the result in the present study was
expected, the explanatory pathways of the phenomenon are not
clear.
On the one hand, it was hypothesized that the reason for this
short-lived effect would be that humor is processed through the
peripheral route, understood as less cognitive elaboration. Our
results do not support this, since political disparagement humor
and non-humorous disparagement political information did not
show differences between them regarding the degree of cognitive
elaboration. However, both of them showed higher cognitive
elaboration than the non-political disparagement humor group.
That is to say, humor did imply less cognitive elaboration, but
disparagement political humor did not.
Therefore, it is not possible in this case to positively state that
the limited durability of the effects of political disparagement
humor on attitudes toward politicians can be explained because
humor communicates through a peripheral route, decreasing the
motivation to counter-argue against the message (Baumgartner
and Morris, 2008).
On the other hand, the behavior of two of the groups of
study 1 was almost identical. Both the experimental group and
the control group exposed to the video with disparagement
non-humorous political content showed decreases in the first
post-exposure evaluation, being different from their previous
measurements and the control group exposed to non-political
disparagement humor.
The conclusion to these two aspects seems to be the same: it
looks as if political humor is not different from other ways of
communicating political content regarding its effects on trust in
politicians. This, considering that all the groups were comparable
in relation to political affiliation and disposition toward the
politicians, would imply that although there could be a positive or
a negative disposition toward politicians, disparagement political
content has an effect in any form in which it is presented.
It is also necessary to refer to the results of study 2. In this case,
there were no effects of political humor on trust in politicians, or
any of the relationships that were observed in study 1. Two ideas
may help explain these results.
The first one refers to the degree of control that experiments
of these characteristics can have. This was not an experiment run
in a laboratory, which makes it difficult to assure that participants
pay proper attention to the stimuli, for example, even when in
this case we did ask participants to rate how much attention they
pay to the stimuli.
The second idea refers to theoretical implications of the
results of study 2. The type of stimulus used in study 1 was
audiovisual, whereas in study 2, only graphic stimuli were used.
There may be something in the content and the form of a
more complex stimulus that arouses more attention and could
therefore generate effects on trust.
There is also the topic of interest in the exposure to political
material. It could be thought that forcing a person to consume
material daily without any particular motivation would have no
effect. In other words, it could be expected that those people who
are more interested in consuming political humor could have
their attitudes affected (or changed) for a longer period because
they would constantly be in contact with stimuli of this kind. As
Baumgartner (2013) suggests, it is possible to think that those
who are more interested in politics and politicians are not only
going to be more interested in consuming information about
it, but also would be more interested in consuming political
humor and, within it, political disparagement humor recurrently.
However, our results do not show an effect of any of these
variables on trust in politicians.
This research has limitations. For example, we have considered
a measure of cognitive elaboration, but there are other ways
of assessing this variable, like thought listing tasks, that could
help as a useful complement. Finding other ways of exposing
participants to political disparagement humor for longer periods
of time would also be useful and could help improving the design
of similar experiments.
The validity of the stimuli is essential in an experiment. In
this case, we tried to assess such validity by asking two students
to rate different elements of the videos and images used in
both studies. However, the rating involved dichotomous answers
(“yes/no”) which could imply not being able to have an idea of
the magnitude of possible differences, even though there was
complete agreement in every evaluation and the manipulation
checks suggest that the stimuli worked properly. It is then
possible that the final results could be caused by differences in this
magnitude and not the exposition to different stimuli. However,
the manipulation checks showed that all the evaluations of the
stimuli were as expected and in an expected direction, which is
an indicator of a good selection and that the observed effects were
very probably caused by the independent variable.
Another evident limitation is not having assessed funniness
and aversiveness in study 2. We were forced to make this
decision because the design of our experiment would have
involved asking participants to rate the stimuli twice a day for
a week, which would, we consider, generate higher attrition.
Aversiveness and funniness are two basic components of the
response to humor, so not considering its impact on participants
could involve two things: one, that what we supposed would
be disparagement humor was not in fact disparagement (not
eliciting more aversiveness than other stimuli) and two, that the
stimuli would not be in fact considered funny. Both elements
would have an impact on trust, considering our design and
the aims of this study. In this case we still had an evaluation
of the stimuli given that two raters evaluated them, but not
having the participants rate both variables and not being able
to control for them (as it was possible in study 1, with clearer
results about the role of both variables in the relation between
exposure and trust) is a limitation of study 2 that we had to
accept.
Finally, a last possible limitation is the low observed statistical
power of Study 2. The method used in both studies to determine
sample sizes considering a power of 0.80 with GPower was good
enough in study 1 but not in study 2. Nevertheless, we think our
results are reliable, given that we exceed the minimum sample
size when power was computed a priori. In addition to this,
the post hoc procedure of power calculation has been criticized
by different authors because it depends on the observed p-value
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and non-significant p-values might correspond to low observed
powers (Goodman and Berlin, 1994; Hoenig and Heisey, 2001).
We have seen that the effect is short-lived, but when exactly
does disparagement humor stop affecting trust in politicians?
Which other variables could help by amplifying or weakening
that effect? This research also showed that disparagement
political humor was not cognitively processed as non-political
humor, which presents an interesting line of research. We think
that this research is a step forward, not only considering its
results, but also considering the questions that arise from it.
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